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Abstract
One of the main reasons why workers’ enterprises (WE ) still rep-
resent a relevant chunk of the economy may lay in some affinities with
conventional profit maximizing firms. To prove this, we compare the en-
try policies of WEs and conventional firms when they can decide size at
entry while having to stick to it afterwards. Even though short run differ-
ences remain, a long run coincidence appears besides that under certainty.
Endogenizing size and time of entry in an uncertain dynamic environment
we see that WEs enter at the same trigger and size of conventional firms.
Both of them wait less and choose a dimension larger than the minimum
efficient scale. This may be another way to explain why WE are still
an important share of the economy (Hesse and Cihàk, 2007) despite the
ongoing mantra of their imminent demise.
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1 Prologue
In Labour Managed firms (LMFs) workers own and govern the enterprise on an
equal foot. LMFs exist in most countries and industries (Craig and Pencavel,
1992, 1995; Moretto and Rossini, 2003). For instance, LM banks are quite
common in both developed and emerging countries and seem to contribute to
equity and financial stability (Hesse and Cihàk, 2007). Last but not least, LMFs
are quite close to firms belonging to the broad US Census category dubbed
Nonemployer (Moretto and Rossini, 2005) and, in particular, to the large subset
corresponding to Partnerships, very popular among infant firms in high tech
sectors.
Whenever we compare a LMF with a conventional profit maximizing firm
(PMF ) we come across some fundamental differences in short run behavior,
while a kind of long run coincidence holds.
In the short run the supply of the LMF reacts in a negative manner to higher
market prices. The same occurs to the amount of labour required. Moreover,
an increase in fixed costs generates a larger membership as the LMF needs fresh
employee-members to bear larger overheads1 . These reactions, deemed as “per-
verse”, have been cast within the original modelling of the LMF (Ward, 1958;
Vanek, 1970) and are still quite popular even though they lack realism since
they are based on the assumption that, in the short term, an LMF changes,
as a result of market signals, the membership size decided at the foundation.
This weakness has been amended by the proponents of the new theory of Work-
ers’ Enterprises (WE ) (Sertel, 1987; 1991; 1993; Fehr and Sertel, 1993). WEs,
based on the evolution of the traditional LMF underpinning, are quite similar
to LMFs, but for membership, that can follow two alternative arrangements.
In the first, size is chosen at the time of entry in the market and is not liable
to vary in the short run. In the second, there exists a competitive market for
memberships and, thanks to it, the number of members can change in the short
run. In both cases “perversities” of the LMF shy away2 .
In the long run LMFs, WEs and PMFs are indistinguishable. This has given
rise to the paradox stating that, in the long run, it is immaterial whether capital
hires labour or the other way round (Samuelson, 1957; Dow, 1993). However,
this result should be taken with great care, since the long run comparison be-
tween PMF and WE is confined to a static framework where the entry process
is not explicitly modeled.
Here comes our main purpose, i.e. to model the entry decision and to test the
long run convergence of WE and PMF with market uncertainty and investment
irreversibility. After all, one of the main reasons why WEs still represent a
significant chunk of the economy may lay in some affinities with respect to
1 We may consider hiring labor that will not become member of the LMF. This possibility
is considered in the literature (Bonin and Putterman, 1987). The resulting LMF is a sort of
hybrid closer to a PMF, or, in other words, an intermediate arrangement between the LMF
and the PMF.
2 A further confirm of the non-perversities of WEs come in a differential game framework
from Cellini and Lambertini (2006).
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conventional firms. In this sense we shall provide a further interpretation of
the persistence of WE in most economies (Hesse and Cihàk, 2007) despite the
ongoing mantra of their imminent demise. To interpret this unexpected survival
(and flourishing) we show fresh similarities between WE and PMF, with market
uncertainty in a dynamic setting when firms can delay entry, which is thought of
as an option that firms possess to enter a market. In this option - like scenario,
firms observe the quantity that market demands. Then, they choose size and
set the price, that triggers entry, in an optimal way. This occurs in the same
way regardless of the market structure (Leahy, 1993, Grenadier 2002). With no
uncertainty in a dynamic setting the trigger prices of WEs and PMF s are the
same (Moretto and Rossini, 2005): the two enterprises follow parallel patterns
and in equilibrium cannot be distinguished. This happens if both firms do not
change, after entry, the amount of labour chosen even when market incentives
require it. The assumption closely mirrors the internal organization of human
capital intensive industries. Here labor has a high specific value and firms are
reluctant either to reduce it or to increase it due to large adjustment costs. This
rigidity makes the PMF quite close to a WE constrained by a fixed membership
after entry. Without this constraint affinities would shrink sharply.
The paper goes on as follows: In the next section we are concerned with the
WE textbook case in a static environment; in section 3 we model entry, size
and trigger prices under uncertainty. Conclusions are drawn in the epilogue.
2 The textbook case
We shortly present the WE static short run model drawn from current litera-
ture.3
We consider a WE producing a homogenous good with the short run Mar-
shallian technologyQ(L), with Q(0) = 0, Q′(L) > 0, Q′′(L) < 0 and L ∈
[
L
¯
, L¯
]
,
where Q is the quantity manufactured and L is the labor input. The good is
sold at price p.
The WE sets optimal membership maximizing the surplus per worker (value
added (y(p;L)) minus market wage (w)):
y(p;L)−w =
pQ(L)− I
L
−w (1)
where I indicates the sunk - fixed cost.
The short run (sr) first order condition (FOC ) yields:
pQ′(LsrWE) = y(p;L
sr
WE) (2)
Provided that y(p;L)−w > 0 we get the well known result that the optimal
amount of labor employed by the WE in the short run is smaller than for the
corresponding PMF, given by the marginal condition pQ′(LsrPM) = w.
3 For a recent survey on the literature on WE and labour participation see Moretto and
Rossini (2003).
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In the long run (lr) competition dissipates all rents. Fresh firms, using same
technology Q(L), same variable and fixed costs, will enter at the Marshallian
point:
pWE = AC(Lˆ) ≡
wLˆ+ I
Q(Lˆ)
, (3)
where AC(Lˆ) is the long run average total cost evaluated at the minimum
efficient scale, i.e.: LlrWE ≡ Lˆ = argminAC(L). Moreover, in the long run
profits are null and the two firms behave the same way, i.e. LlrWE = L
lr
PM .
3 WE’s entry under uncertainty
The above analysis is confined to a deterministic framework and considers a WE
already in the market, neglecting the entry process.
Our main purpose is to model the entry policy of a single WE in isolation
regardless of rivals. In this sense we may say that the firm is myopic. Then
we shall see what happens if the firm becomes farsighted dismissing its myopic
habit.
We start investigating a WE that has an option to enter the market with
an irreversibly sunk investment project of finite size. The controls are time of
entry and size in terms of labor membership.
In the vein of real option theory we assume that (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994):
1. The project, corresponding to a start-up decision, is of finite size with an
entry cost I and technology described above.
2. The investment I is irreversibly sunk. It can neither be changed, nor
temporarily stopped, nor shut down but it can be delayed while waiting
for new information.4
3. For the sake of comparison with the textbook case, the instantaneous short
run surplus per worker after entry is equal to (1) when the market wage
w per unit of labour is constant over time.
4. The WE faces an infinitely elastic demand function: the uncertain market
price is driven by the following trendless stochastic differential equation:
dpt = σptdBt with σ > 0 and p0 = p, (4)
where dBt is the standard increment of a Wiener process.
5
5. The project is funded by WE members, who are all alike and maximize
the discounted value of expected individual value added.
4 This avoids the analysis of operating options, such as the ability of the firm to reduce
output and to shut down. These options increase the value of the firm. See McDonald and
Siegel (1986) and, for a thorough discussion, Dixit and Pindyck (1994, chs. 6 and 7).
5 By the Markov property of the process pt, the results do not change qualitatively assuming
a positive (or negative) trend of price (Dixit, 1993). Moreover, analogous results will be
obtained if uncertainty is embedded in costs (See Dixit and Pindyck, 1994).
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6. Finally, as pointed out in the introduction with regard to the change in
membership, L is chosen before entry and held fixed afterwards.
Given these assumptions, only if the price is high enough, the WE enters set-
ting the optimal size (L). The decision process requires a backward procedure.
First, for any L, the value of the individual option to enter is computed. Subse-
quently, homogeneous employee-members of the WE chose L which maximizes
the individual (option) value at entry.
The employee-member of a WE of size L determines whether and when to
start the new project solving an optimal stopping time problem by choosing the
investment timing which maximizes:
fWE(p;L) = max
T
E0
[
(y(pT ;L)−w) e
−ρT | p0 = p
]
(5)
Each employee-member holds an option to invest corresponding to (5) and
has an interest in exercising it cooperatively at the same time. He waits up
to time T, where T is a random variable whose distribution can be obtained
from that of (4). Then, he invests when pt, starting from p0, reaches an upper
value, say pWE. Assuming that pWE exists, taking expectation of (5) and using
the distribution of T , we are able to write the member’s value function, before
investing, as (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994; Dixit et al., 1999):
fWE(p;L) = (y(pWE;L)−w)
(
p
pWE
)β
for p < pWE. (6)
where 1 < β < ∞ is the positive root of the auxiliary quadratic equation
Ψ(β) = 12σ
2β(β − 1) − ρ = 0. The individual option value (6) represents the
expected net per capita dividend of the project, i.e., y(pWE;L)−w, multiplied
by the expected discount factor, i.e.,
(
p
pWE
)β
. Therefore, the optimal investing
rule implies that fWE(p;L) > y(p;L)−w for all p < pWE.
Consistently with (1), entry occurs if the cash flow generated by the project
is weakly larger than the long-run average cost. Maximizing (6) for pWE, we
see that the WE should invest when the market price exceeds the break-even
threshold:
pWE =
β
β − 1
AC(L) (7)
which is the (deterministic) Marshall trigger AC(L) multiplied by β
β−1 > 1, due
to irreversibility of entry. The consequence is that, with new observations on
market profitability obtained by waiting, the enterprise reduces the downside
risk (Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, p. 142).
Substituting (7) back into (6) and maximizing with respect to L, the optimal
entry size of WE can be obtained from:
pWEQ
′(LsrWE) = w + fWE(L
sr
WE) > w. (8)
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where fWE(L
sr
WE) ≡
1
β−1(w +
I
Lsr
WE
).
The WE chooses the optimal size equating the value marginal product, which
is decreasing by concavity of the technology, to the “supplemented wage”, that
exceeds the market wage w. The Marshallian full cost of the investment imputed
to each employee-member is w+ fWE, larger than w, since each member of the
WE owns an equal option to delay entry. After all, would-be employee-members
are workers endowed with the option (and the skill) to build an egalitarian
partnership making for a compensation larger than w.
Let us now turn to the long-run. Since competition dissipates all rents, the
option value to delay entry goes to zero (i.e. fWE = 0). However, by the infinite
elasticity of demand, the optimal entry trigger (7) is not altered (Leahy, 1993,
p.1118; Dixit and Pindyck, 1994, p. 254-257; Grenadier, 2002, p.703-704 ). All
firms are alike and demand is infinitely elastic. Then, each employee-member
maximizes her individual option to enter. By doing that she ends up choosing
the optimal dimension of the industry as a whole. This means that LlrWE is the
dimension of a WE encompassing all employee-members in the industry.
Then, we may prove that:
Proposition 1 a) Long run competition forces the WE to operate with a larger
dimension than in the short run, i.e.:
LsrWE < Lˆ < L
lr
WE,
b) The entry trigger prices react in distinct ways in the long run vis à vis
the short run, i.e.:
∂psrWE
∂L
> 0
∂plrWE
∂L
< 0.
Proof. See Appendix.
To sum up:
1. under uncertainty the WE enters in both the short run and the long run if
the market price is larger than the average total cost AC(L) ≡ wL+I
Q(L) multiplied
by a coefficient β
β−1 ,
2. the myopic WE enters with a size lower than minimum efficient scale Lˆ
3. the farsighted WE under long run competition adopts a size which is
above the efficient scale Lˆ.
In other words, in the short run myopic equilibrium, the WE operates to the
left of the minimum efficient scale, while, in the long run farsighted equilibrium,
to the right.
Furthermore, we notice that, the optimal entry triggers of the short run WE
and of the long rune WE react in opposite ways with respect to dimension.
Then, although we do not know whether psrWE is larger or smaller than p
lr
WE,
since it depends on the shape of AC(L), as a result of competition - free entry -
firms exercise their option sooner since the potential entry of new rivals reduces
the value of the option to wait in the hands of the members of the WE.
Finally, in the long-run the WE chooses optimal size equating the value
marginal product to the market wage w. This choice coincides with that of a
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PMF that determines the amount of labor to hire before entry sticking to it
afterwards, regardless of market signals (Moretto and Rossini, 2005). When
considering the effects of free entry, both the PMF and the WE abandon their
respective myopic attitude and their behaviors converge, i.e., they enter with a
size larger than that dictated by the minimum efficient scale level and, ceteris
paribus, wait less before entering.
4 Epilogue
In an uncertain dynamic environment firms may anticipate competitive reactions
of potential rivals. If they have the option of deciding the best time to start
producing and if they cannot change their size after entry, a long run coincidence
between a WE and a conventional firm emerges.
At entry in a myopic environment WEs are smaller than conventional firms.
While, in the long run under uncertainty, free entry and risk neutrality a PMF
and a WE both enter with an equal and larger size than that dictated by the
minimum efficient scale. Moreover, they wait less as they both anticipate the
effects of entry.
Even though our results have been obtained in a simplified framework, the
coincidence of behavior at entry between a WE and PMF facing after-entry
labor rigidities, provide a further interpretation of the persistence of WE in
many industries where human capital specificities make labor flexibility costly.
A more realistic picture requires that each firm perceive the industry demand
in the long run as a downward sloping curve. If that was the case, also the
optimal triggers would differ between the myopic and the non myopic WE.
Nonetheless, as proved by Grenadier (2002) for the PMF, the results do not
change much.
5 Appendix
First part of the Proposition.
Substituting (7) into ((6) and rearranging we write the L-th employee-
member’s value of the project prior to investing:
fWE(p;L) = A(L)p
β for p < pWE(L), (9)
where the constant A(L) is given by:
A(L) ≡
(β − 1)β−1
ββ
AC(L)−β
(wL+ I)
L
> 0 (10)
By (9) the optimal dimension requires choosing L for which A(L) is the largest.
This is equivalent to maximizing
a(L) ≡ AC(L)−β
(wL+ I)
L
,
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which gives the first order condition:
LNQ
′(LN)
Q(LN)
= 1−
(β − 1)
β
I
(w
ρ
LN + I)
(11)
Since the r.h.s. of (11) is less than one, a necessary condition for an optimal
solution is an output elasticity εQL ≡
LQ′(L)
Q(L) < 1, i.e., the average productivity
Q(L)
L
must be a decreasing function of labor, as from Assumption 1. By simple
manipulation of (11) we get (8).
By Assumptions 4 and 5, the option value to invest by the industry as a
whole is given by:
FWE(p;L) = fWE(p;L)L (12)
where fWE(p;L) is the value of the project for the L-th member of the WE,
given by (9). Defining b(L) ≡ La(L), the optimal size is simply given by:6
b′(L) = a(L) + La′(L) = 0, (13)
Over the range where the SOC holds a′(LsrWE ) = 0. Therefore, b
′(LsrWE) =
a(LsrWE) > 0. If an L
lr
WE exists such that b
′(LlrWE) = 0, this will necessarily be:
LsrWE < L
lr
WE.
Second part of the Proposition.
Define the average cost function AC(L) ≡ wL+I
Q(L) . By the concavity of Q(L)
it is easy to show that limL→0AC(L) = +∞ and limL→+∞AC(L) = +∞. By
taking the derivative with respect to L, we get:
∂AC
∂L
=
wQ(L)− (wL+ I)Q′(L)
Q(L)2
=
{
< 0 if εQL =
LQ′(L)
Q(L) > 1−
I
(wL+I)
> 0 if εQL =
LQ′(L)
Q(L) < 1−
I
(wL+I)
(14)
Then, a value Lˆ > 0 exists such that ∂AC
∂L
= 0 and it is given by:
LˆQ′(Lˆ)
Q(Lˆ)
=
(
1−
I
(wLˆ+ I)
)
. (15)
The second order condition confirms that AC(L) is a convex function with a
minimum represented by Lˆ. Since (β−1)
β
< 1, by comparing (15) and (11), we
notice that in the short run the WE operates only in the descending branch of
the average cost curve to the left of the minimum. That is:
1−
(β − 1)
β
I
(wL+ I)
> 1−
I
(wL+ I)
6 The SOC is:
b′′(L) = 2a′(L) + La′′(L) < 0.
In general a′′(L) < 0 does not imply that b′′(L) < 0: the two regions, where the SOC holds,
overlap only partially.
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which implies that Lˆ > LsrWE. On the contrary,by comparing (15) and (13), we
have:
(β − 1)
β
(
1−
I
(wL+ I)
)
< 1−
I
(wL+ I)
,
which, in the range where the SOC holds, implies that Lˆ < LlrWE.
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